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Magun: Reply to Comments

I am grateful for the thoughtful and generous responses to our papers. They
go in somewhat different directions, and I wouldn’t be able to address everything that
has been said.
I agree with most. Certainly, the state got relatively autonomous from the
society that it had depoliticized, and turned into a violent monopoly, Weber style.
However, unlike the Western version of supra-capitalist state, we are dealing here
with an anomic state based on gangster logic. This is reminiscent of the “primitive
accumulation” or crisis capitalism of the US in the early twentieth century. Marx and
Engels associated the destructive effect of the bourgeoisie on society with the
revolutionary destruction. In the classical account of Marx, from the Capital, the
privatization of land via enclosures allowed the British gentry to accumulate the
wealth, which was productive for capitalism ,but destructive of the social bond. In
our Russian case, there is a combination of emancipation and disaster that differs
from the enclosure narrative. There are different sub-species of primitive
accumulation, to be further discussed. Both Yudin and I point to the collapse of the
global Left, which made a radical right-wing transformation of post-Soviet Russia
possible (as well as a not-so-radical right-wing transformation of Ukraine). Any
resurgence of the Left would require an internationalist program that would go
beyond “struggle against capitalism” toward a theory of the Left-Wing State like the
one I develop in The Future of the State.
As for the notion of “political capitalism” advanced by Greg, Albena, and also
by Volodimir Ishchenko in his powerful recent article, I agree only in part. Political
capitalism is actually feudalism, as Albena rightly says. Can we analyze it, then, as a
subspecies of capitalism, or is it something else? Can we consider a society
neoliberal if it provides a decently efficient healthcare, childcare, a universal-if
limited-pension system, and if it relies on the rich networks of mutual help among
friends and relatives (in spite of the moral individualism)? Can the economic/
capitalist struggles really explain the anti-Western “war-of-civilizations” behavior?
And is, as a result, Russian politics just a radicalized version of the Western
“predatory” neoliberal state?
I think that the answer to all these questions is ”no,” and that we fail to
recognize the importance of current events if we do not use a dialectical, not linear,
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methodology, in exploring the logical connection between capitalism and militaristic
statism. This is a long conversation, but I claim that:
1. State and capitalist economy are isomorphic, but this doesn’t mean that the state
is simply a capitalist enterprise on a larger scale. Quantity changes into quality
here. When a national government follows the logic of a gang (“state capture”),
something changes, and the state acts on the mildly anti-capitalist, anti-globalist
agenda of post-socialist conservatism. This is a fascist nationalist, corporatist, and
a conservative-socialist project that openly denies one of the bases of capitalism
(the open market and free entrepreneurship). Its international ideology is that of
mercantilism, the opposite of neoliberal economic philosophy. Schmitt rightly
showed that when the logic of competition goes to the political level, it changes
character and acquires an existential antagonistic nature. In this sense, political
capitalism is no longer capitalism, it is noteven “normal” politics (in the sense of
reflective rational structures), rather, it is an anarchist project alternating between
de-politicization and total mobilization.
2. The current Russian leadership practices feudalism, mercantilism, and
imperialism, in a dialogue with the West: it reveals the feudal/imperial unconscious
of globalist capitalism, and turns into an explicit political form: here is what you
actually are; see yourself in our mirror. This is the real logic of the political
unconscious (and not what Jameson thinks it is . The state is the symptom of civil
society taken as its perverse mirror. However, compare the welfare policies of the
1950-60s in the West: Enzo rightly points out that those were a distorted response
to the real, though undemocratically managed, social infrastructure of the Soviet
state. The relationship of dialectical mimicry seemed to go in a different direction
back then.
3. For these reasons, the Russian state (and to some extent, the Turkish and
Chinese states) are not just other versions of Western capitalism, but its
determinate negations that, in the Russian case, take a nihilist turn. Any claim that
“Trump is the same as Putin” is naïve and objectively erroneous. US society relies
on a net of formal conventions and moral limitations that are qualitatively different
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from the anomie of the non-Western empires. What is, however, increasingly
Russian-like is the degree of polarization and paranoia that characterizes US
society and is partly the result of the logic of propaganda underlying the capitalist
practice of advertisement and lobbying, and partly of the obsession with the
conservative/imperial unconscious of the US as a project. In other words, the US
is at its most vulnerable in international relations where it deals with conservative
opponents of various sorts: there, it is immediately contaminated by their onesidedness, in the same way that the Soviet society got increasingly contaminated
with fascism.
4. As I have repeatedly argued, there may not be an international Left without
recognizing the perspective of the Eastern European and more widely, dissident,
Left: the value of the West as a project of democratic and rational Enlightenment
that may serve as a regulative ideal for the future world polity. As long as the
Western Left reduces the nature of its own society to “capitalism,” it withdraws any
hope from the idealistic struggle for universals that the non-Western Left might
lead. Here, even though I don’t fully agree with Žižek’s recent belligerent rhetoric, I
accept his insistence on the defense of the European project as the site of
Enlightenment. (However, going to war with an opponent instead of discussing and
establishing global forms of coexistence, is precisely the uncivilized political form
which the West had to overcome repeatedly in its history).
5. David Strecker’s long and useful commentary comes down to the same points of
contention that have been addressed in the text and in the discussion. When
emphasizing the non-economic factors of the war in Ukraine, David speaks to the
converted: our analysis, in both papers, originated from the call of Albena
Azmanova to reflect on the role of capitalism in these events. And of course,
Russian capitalism is not the classical, entrepreneurial version but its rent-based
appendage, but running on the same rules.
Of course, there are other factors, too. Russia is not only emulating the West (in a
caricature way) but also opposing it, fighting against it: this is the major political
element. However, I would not quite agree with David (and partly Greg) that Putin
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would be acting against Ukraine as a source of liberal democratic influence. This
would be too far from the Russian elites’ subjective mindset. They are afraid, not of
liberalism as such but, more precisely, of revolution. It is the new revolutionary
legitimacy that poses a direct mortal threat, and in this sense Putin is a Bonaparte
with a consciousness of Sacred Alliance.
More important is David’s rejoinder: “Would it not be necessary to distinguish
clearly between the idea of socialism and the 20th century dictatorships of the
state socialist bloc? And how convincing is it to characterize the social democratic
policies and institutions in the West, at least some of which having emerged as
functional to the reproduction of capitalism and some to uphold authoritarian rule,
as socialist forces counterbalancing capitalism?” But this is my entire point. From
the point of view of a European critical intellectual, the regime around him/her is
essentially capitalism, and social-democratic policies are just superstructure above
it, the way it absorbs socialism for its own need. (This is the mainstream of the
current Marxist theory of the state, but in my view it unconsciously approaches
Weberian subtle apologetics: capitalism is a complex economic system which
defines everything and is alienating, but it is a modernist rationality that is better
than the alternatives).

In contrast, from the point of view of a Russian or maybe even US intellectual,
“quantity turns into quality,” and this kind of socialism does partly contradict
capitalism. Without destroying capitalism completely, the social-democratic state
creates a society where the strong social policies are accompanied by high
bureaucratization, high value of solidarity and by the global support of radical
democratic movements on the side of the oppressed. To us, it often seems that
some movement is only being subjective while it has already taken an objective
form and is hypostasized (as, for instance, it would seem to the liberal
intellectuals in the late Soviet Union: their anti-Soviet liberal stance was
unconsciously motivated by the transformation of the regime itself).
A crisis like the present one only becomes intelligible against a backdrop of a
dialectical theory which ultimately has to show that the crisis was a result of the
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internal contradiction inside the western liberal capitalist society: the one, very
roughly put, between capitalism and social democracy.
6. When we think what is to be done, then, following Enzo’s suggestion, we should
not focus so much on the case-by-case protection of human rights, but we
shouldn’t expect the strong “grassroots” movements either1. Grassroots, like
sunflowers, develop in the direction where dominant ideology goes. The emphasis
on spontaneity is a problem in the current pro-revolutionary/democratic side of
Western policy. While such emphasis is genuine and welcome in the West, it is
counterproductive in the rest of the world.Here, we should, like the neoliberals/
euro-bureaucrats and against them:
1. Form an international transformative force (as Gal rightly suggests)
2. If successful, engage in social engineering, with inventing and constituting
new global institutions and local actors who would then be capable of their
own agency.
7. I want to thank Albena and everyone for this rich discussion, which clearly went far
beyond the specific issue of the causes of the war in Ukraine. We should aim to
hold a conference/seminar on the dialectic of capitalism and socialism, at some
near point.

1

One thing is to defend dissidents from an a priori oppressive government, another, to support a
transformative national force.
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